Optimizely hack served card-skimming and crypto-stealing code on 178 major websites
Attackers abused a flaw in Optimizely's experimentation platform to slip malicious JavaScript onto the websites of 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC and Salesforce, on 16 November. The code tried to swap crypto wallet addresses, skim card details and target older iPhones. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed.

Malicious code was quietly delivered to visitors of some of the world's best-known websites on Monday 16 November 2026, after attackers abused a weakness in Optimizely, a widely used platform that companies rely on to test and personalise their web pages.
Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI said his team found the code in 188 Optimizely scripts belonging to 178 organisations, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, the hardware-wallet maker Ledger and the streaming service Peacock. The injected code was designed to steal cryptocurrency, skim payment cards and, on some iPhones and iPads, load known exploit kits.
Optimizely said an "unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability" in its Experimentation account signup flow to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company says it has fixed the flaw, removed the code and secured affected accounts. Much remains unknown, including how many people were exposed and how much data, if any, reached the attackers.
What happened on 16 November?
Optimizely Web works by having each customer place a small JavaScript "snippet" on its pages. The snippet is served from Optimizely's content delivery network and contains the customer's experiments plus an optional field for custom "Project JavaScript", code that runs on every page where the snippet loads.
According to Report URI's investigation, the attacker wrote extra code into that Project JavaScript field across many unrelated customer projects. The rest of each file was untouched, and it was still served from Optimizely's own trusted domain with a valid certificate. Helme stressed that this was altered project content rather than a "cache poisoning" attack on the delivery network itself, and that Optimizely's own sites carried the code too.
The injected line pulled in a further script from an attacker-controlled domain. Some copies hid the address using base64 encoding, and some carried a full inline copy of the payload so it could still run if the external address was blocked. Report URI's timeline traces the first Optimizely injection to about 04:21 UTC (9:21 AM PKT) on 16 November, on the BBC's snippet. A mass clean-up followed in the evening, and by 21:52 UTC only one of the 188 infected snippets still contained the code.
BleepingComputer said it independently confirmed, using urlscan.io records, that the malicious script loaded or tried to load on sites including Zoom, KLM, GitLab, the BBC, CNN, Smartsheet, Stamps.com and Salesforce. It also listed Fox News, Air France, Change.org, HSBC Insurance, Bitly, IG and UNICEF USA among affected sites.
What was the malicious code designed to do?
Researchers who analysed the payload describe a multi-purpose theft kit. According to Report URI, BleepingComputer and the security firm StepSecurity (as reported by Cointelegraph and iTWire), it was built to:
- Swap cryptocurrency addresses. It scanned pages, form fields and the clipboard for wallet addresses on several blockchains and replaced them with the attacker's own, so a user copying an address could unknowingly paste the attacker's instead.
- Skim payment cards. From about 13:43 UTC, it watched form submissions for a card number, expiry date and security code, then tried to send them to an attacker-controlled server.
- Grab cookies and screenshots. In some circumstances it collected the page address, cookies not protected by the HttpOnly setting, and a rendered screenshot of the page.
- Target older iPhones and iPads. On Apple mobile devices it loaded additional code that Helme linked to the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which target older iOS versions.
There were limits. StepSecurity found the card skimmer could not read payment fields kept inside a separate payment provider's frame, such as those used by Stripe or Adyen, and could not reach HttpOnly cookies. Hudson Rock, another security firm, said it found evidence of the iOS delivery chain but that this did not show a real iPhone had been successfully compromised, according to iTWire.
How much was stolen, and who was hurt?
That is not yet clear. Report URI said wallets embedded in the code had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, with funds swept to exchanges during the day. Cointelegraph put receipts at around $7,100 from blockchain records, while StepSecurity estimated roughly $6,600 and noted that some wallets were active before the attack. Alex Thorn, head of firmwide research at Galaxy Digital, estimated victims had sent only around $2,300, saying much of the Bitcoin appeared to be the attacker's own funds routed back to their wallet.
Helme said his team could not see how many card numbers or cookies reached the attackers' server. He also noted that his count covers only the Optimizely snippets his team could find and check in time, so the true number of affected organisations may be higher.
Hudson Rock cautioned that an affected public web page does not by itself mean an organisation's internal systems were breached. Salesforce said it was investigating "unauthorized modifications to Optimizely scripts" on some of its websites and had disabled Optimizely scripts as a precaution. The Daily Context has not seen statements from the other named organisations.
What has Optimizely said?
In a statement given to BleepingComputer and Cointelegraph, Optimizely said: "We have blocked access to the vulnerable path and deployed a fix. We have removed the injected code from affected projects. We have also ended active sessions, revoked tokens, and reset access for affected user accounts." It added that it had blocked code delivery through Cloudflare, had notified all affected customers and was continuing to investigate.
A notice on Optimizely's status page, posted at 01:02 UTC on 17 November (6:02 AM PKT), said the vulnerability had been fixed, the injected code removed and "additional protections" put in place, and listed the incident as being monitored. The company has not publicly explained how a flaw in its signup flow gave the attacker the ability to change other customers' projects, and the attacker's identity is unknown.
Why does a "supply chain" attack like this matter?
Modern websites load code from many outside providers, for analytics, advertising, consent banners and testing. If one of those providers is compromised, its customers' sites can serve harmful code without their own servers ever being touched. Helme's summary was blunt: "trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy."
Report URI's timeline also links the same actor to an earlier wave from 13 November that injected code through other third-party scripts on sites including faz.net and smh.com.au. The incident follows a run of high-profile digital disruptions in recent weeks, including a major Microsoft 365 outage and disruption to several large US banking apps, according to CNBC-TV18, although there is no evidence those events are connected to this attack.
What should visitors and website owners do?
Researchers advise anyone who visited an affected site on 16 November to:
- check any cryptocurrency transfers made that day and confirm the destination address was the one intended;
- watch card statements for unfamiliar transactions and contact their card issuer if anything looks wrong;
- update iPhones and iPads to the latest available iOS or iPadOS version;
- keep an eye on accounts they were logged into while browsing affected sites.
For website operators using Optimizely, Helme recommends reviewing custom project and experiment code, checking which users, tokens and integrations can change it, and rotating credentials. StepSecurity advises checking historical browser and security-policy reports, because a clean script downloaded after the clean-up cannot show what was served earlier. A strict Content Security Policy can block scripts and connections to unexpected domains.
Image: Martin Vorel, CC BY-SA 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via Wikimedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Programming_code.jpg) — 2016 file photo of HTML and JavaScript code on a screen; illustrative only, not the malicious code; cropped and resized
About this article: prepared by The Daily Context editorial desk using automated, source-based reporting from the publications linked below. No reporter was on the ground.
Sources
- Report URI (Scott Helme): World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely (16 November 2026) https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
- BleepingComputer: Optimizely hack infected CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce sites with malware (16 November 2026) https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/optimizely-supply-chain-attack-infects-major-brands-sites-with-malware/
- Optimizely status page: Web Experimentation Security Incident (17 November 2026) https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z
- Cointelegraph: Hackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websites (17 November 2026) https://ct.com/news/hackers-inject-malware-into-178-major-websites
- iTWire: Optimizely says it has fixed flaw used to inject malicious scripts (17 November 2026) https://itwire.com/business-it-news/security/optimizely-says-it-has-fixed-flaw-used-to-inject-malicious-scripts
- CNBC-TV18: BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce, Zoom among 178 organisations hit by malware: Report URI (17 November 2026) https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/bbc-cnn-hsbc-salesforce-zoom-among-178-organisations-hit-by-malware-report-uri-20035591.htm
Kabeer Ahmad
Kabeer Ahmad is the founder and editor of The Daily Context. He oversees the site's source-based coverage of world affairs, technology, business, entertainment, lifestyle and sports, and is responsible for its editorial standards, sourcing and corrections.


